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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Joseph L. Krofcheck, appeals from an order
that attempts to amend, nunc pro tunc, the prior judgment and Decree
of Foreclosure dated March 4, 1974, herein.

Said order purportedly

granted further attorney fees and expenses to Plaintiff-Respondent
covering proceedings, entertained subsequent to such foreclosure,
in the Utah Supreme Court,

The Appellant was at all times a non-

assuming grantee of the original mortgagor in said foreclosure
action and proceedings in the Utah Supreme Court.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
Upon Plaintiff-Respondent's February 26, 1976, motion to amend
the original Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure herein, the Third
District Court in and for Summit County, Utah, entered its Order,
nunc pro tunc, on March 17, 1976, which amended said original Judgment and Decree of March 4, 1974, and awarded Plaintiff-Respondent
the additional sum of the $5,621.98 as attorneys' fees and expenses
incurred for resisting proceedings initiated by the Appellant, subsequent to said final foreclosure decree, in the Utah Supreme Court.
Said award was ordered disbursed to Plaintiff-Respondent from the
funds that were on deposit with the Clerk constituting the excess
monies realized from the Sheriff's Sale of Appellant's real property,
under the subject mortgages, conducted on April 9, 1974.
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order entered by the lower
court which amended, nunc pro tunc, the final foreclosure Judgment
and Decree of March 4, 1974, by awarding additional attorney fees
and expenses to Respondent covering Appellant's prior appeal herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the year 1967, Respondent's predecessor, as seller, and
Appellant's predecessor, as buyer, entered into an agreement for
the sale and purchase of real property.

Said buyer executed

promissory notes secured by mortgages on the subject realty for
the balance of the purchase price, after making a substantial cash
down payment.
Subsequently, Respondent succeeded to the seller's interest
under said notes and mortgages, and Appellant succeeded to the
interest of the buyer in the real property covered by the mortgages,
but Appellant did not make an assumption of the obligations under
said mortgage notes.
Other entities, not parties

to the instant proceeding, were

made liable for the monetary obligations under said notes and
mortgages by virtue of the lower court's final judgment in Civil
No. 4143, in the year 1971, whereby certain defendants in such
action, but not Appellant, were ordered to pay the same.
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Respondent filed the above-entitled action to foreclose its
subject mortgages, in May, 1972.

At no time did Respondent per-

sonally serve the Appellant with summons but they purportedly
effected service of summons by publication upon Appellant, a
permanent California resident, during late 1973 and early 1974.
On February 22, 1974, the clerk of the court below entered
Appellant's default, and on March 4, 1974, said court entered its
judgment and decree of foreclosure.
On April 9, 1974, Appellant's real property as embraced by the
Respondent's mortgages was sold at public auction and the Intervenors
in this action were the successful bidders thereof.
On October 4, 1974, Appellant filed a motion in the lower court
to set aside his default and vacate the foreclosure decree and sale.
Said motion was denied on March 3, 1975.
Thereafter, Appellant appealed said order of March 3, 1975,
to this Court pursuant to Utah Supreme Court number 14031.
Appellant's said appeal, although unavailing, was meritorious
and based, inter alia, upon a defective service of summons by
publication.
This Court affirmed the lower court's aforesaid March 3, 1975
order pursuant to its decision in said Case Number 14031, dated
January 26, 1976, and awarded "costs to plaintiff (respondent)".
Further attorney fees or expenses herein were neither requested by
Respondent nor rendered by this Court.
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It was after the foregoing proceedings were culminated that
Respondent sought, through the nunc pro tunc order of March 17,
1976 herein, to obtain its attorney fees and expenses from the
court below as recited under "Disposition of Lower Court" in
this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO EXERCISE ITS NUNC PRO TUNC
POWERS ACCORDING TO LAW.

When the lower court ! s original March 4, 1974, foreclosure
decree was entered several thousand dollars was allowed Respondent
for attorney fees and costs.

No_ provision was then made for ad-

ditional fees or costs.
Thereafter, the lower court lost jurisdiction when Appellant
took his first appeal herein and only costs were granted Respondent
by the Utah Supreme Court as a result of said appeal.

However,

after the filing of the remittitur, the lower court attempted to
change its prior original final order for attorney fees and costs,
through the purported nunc pro tunc order complained of in this
brief.
These facts require application of the fundamental legal
doctrine stated by these authorities:
"....when a court exceeds its power in entering a
purported nunc pro tunc order, the order is invalid.
The function of an order nunc pro tunc is to record
an order actually made, which, through some oversight or inadvertence, was never entered on the
records of the court, or which was incorrectly
entered. An order nunc pro tunc cannot do more
than supply a record of something that was actually
done at the time to which it is retroactive. Such
entry may be made in order to save proceedings that
have been had before it is made, but where no proceedings have been had and the jurisdiction of the
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court over the subject has been withdrawn in the
meantime, a court has no power to make a nunc pro
tunc order. A nunc pro tunc amendment or correction
of a court order is not proper to correct judicial
errors or omissions or to change an order actually
rendered. If the court has omitted to make an order
that it might or ought to have made at a particular
term, it cannot make the order nunc pro tunc after
the term or at a subsequent term (citing cases from
many jurisdictions)", (Emphasis added)
56 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 37-38
"On Appeal - Where allowance was made for attorney
fees in foreclosure decree, which was affirmed on
appeal, trial court could not subsequent to the
filing therein of the remittitur allow additional
attorney fees for services rendered in resisting
appeal and thereupon enter a supplemental judgment
whereby the additional amount allowed was incorporated in, and became part of, original decree,
since provisions of mortgage became merged in decree
which governed rights of the parties, and decree
containing no provision for additional attorney
fees could not be allowed." (Emphasis added)
59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Sect. 812, Page 1551, F.N. #75
The Utah Code Annotated, Vol. 9 at page 336, cites the foregoing rule as a "Collateral

Reference" to Utah law:

UCA, Sect. 78-37-9.

The California jurisdiction appears to be a substantial basis
for the aforesaid principles, where applied to the specific facts of
Appellant's cause herein. The yery latest California case on the subject, repeats the rule in this June 18, 1969, decision:
"After remittitur is filed, trial court has no
authority to entertain a motion for counsel fees
on appeal unless authority is conferred on it by
the appellate court. Where no authority to hear
and determine matter of attorney fees for services
rendered on appeal had been conferred on trial
court by Court of Appeal in its decision, or in
remittitur, trial court was without jurisdiction
after the judgment became final to hear plaintiff's
motion for counsel fees on appeal."
American City Bank v. Zetlen, (Calif. 1969)
76 Cal. Rptr. 898.
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Further to the foregoing, are these expressions from other
jurisdictions:
"Court's order awarding attorney fees for appeal
was error where notes involved did not contain
any clause concerning attorney fees on appeal".
Lake KiHarney Apts. Inc. v. Estate of Thompson,
(Fla. 1973) 283 So. 2nd 102.
"Where contract between litigants specifically
provided that prevailing party would be entitled
to attorney fees in action but did not provide for
attorney fees to either party on appeal, prevailing party was not entitled to award of attorney
fees on appeal."
McMillan v. Golden, (Ore. 1972) 497 P.2nd 1166.
The only Utah Supreme Court ruling on the subject, encountered
by the undersigned, follows the legal principles hereinbefore
outlined:
"3. No attorney fee for trying the case in the
Supreme Court is recoverable as costs ... As to
the item charged as attorney fee, we know of no
law authorizing its allowance for trials in this
Court on appeal."
Marks v. Culmer, 7 Utah 163, 25 P. 743.
As to Respondent's contention that "equity" should permit recovery of their attorney fees and expenses on appeal, this Utah case
states the doctrine of law which applies to the foreclosure decree
herein:
"Foreclosure is statutory ... must be conducted
in accordance with the statutes." (Emphasis added).
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529,
540; 144 P2nd 276
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POINT II: RESPONDENT'S CLAIMS INVOLVE FEES AND COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE
ONLY TO THE APPELLANT KROFCHECK, WHO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE
THEREFOR AS A NON-ASSUMING GRANTEE OF THE MORTGAGED REAL
PROPERTY.
The principal debtor which actually executed the subject notes
and mortgages was the Major-Blakeney Corporation, Appellant's predecessor twice removed.

Said corporation was the mortgagor which

agreed to pay a reasonable attorney's fee in the lower court (not
on appeal).
Appellant acquired the subject mortgaged realty from Park City
Utah Corporation, the latter having purchased from Major-Blakeney
Corporation,

At no time did Appellant assume any of the obligations

under the said notes and mortgages; nor did Appellant make the installment payments thereunder, since the lower court's final 1971
judgment in Civil No. 4143 (Statement of Facts, supra.) required
others to do so.
However, only Appellant Krofcheck was involved in the legal proceedings incident to the appeal covered by Utah Supreme Court decision
No. 14031, such appeal being the basis of Respondent's claims for
additional attorney fees and expenses to resist said appeal; and,
which sums were granted by the lower court pursuant to its nunc pro
tunc order complained of herein.
Appellant's said appeal centered around issues of improper notice
to him of the original foreclosure action.

Such effort was his con-

stitutional right, which is independent of the obligations embraced
by the principal debtor under the mortgage instruments.
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Appearing as a "Collateral Reference" under Sect. 78-37-9,
of the Utah Code Annotated, is found this statement of the appropriate rule covering the foregoing facts:
"The general rule is to allow attorney fees
against the principal debtor and against the
land (res) which is the subject of litigation,
and not. against other and incidental defendants...
A. grantee assuming no liability under a_ mortgage
is not liable for the mortgagee's attorney fee
on foreclosure, nor may a simple indorser of
notes, who does not sign the mortgage or trust
deed, be held responsible for attorney fees
(citing much authority)" (Emphasis added)
59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Section 812, Page 1555
Therefore, it was improper not only for the lower court to
award fees and expenses, nunc pro tunc, against Appellant for his
appeal, it was likewise error for that court to order such fees and
expenses paid from Appellant's funds

(the land had been already

foreclosed and sold), then on deposit with the Clerk.
DATED this

fi^

day of June, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,

DON R. STRONG, for appellant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Served two copies of the foregoing brief upon counsel for
Respondent, by mailing the same to the address set forth on the
cover hereof, postage prepaid, this
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/ $ - — d a y of June, 1975.

